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a b s t r a c t
This paper proposes a “logical experiment”, illustrating how alternative international
monetary systems may produce opposite results in the global economy. In the current
organisation, “key currencies” work as international money. Keynes, by contrast, proposed
that this role should be assigned to a supranational, “credit” money. While the world cur-
rently lives in an asymmetric regime, which lead to what has been deﬁned as a “balance of
ﬁnancial terror”, Keynes tried to achieve a more peaceful type of “international balance”. I
argue that the structural reform and the technical provisions proposed by the “Keynes Plan”
may still – at least in principle – provide useful remedies for international disequilibria, by
remedying the asymmetries of the current international payments architecture andhelping
to curb both inﬂationary and deﬂationary pressures on the world economy.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the last decades, the international economy has been
characterised by well-known “global imbalances”.1 Facts
include: (i)wide andpersistent current account deﬁcits run
by the US, with correspondingly high surpluses in some
emerging economies; (ii) large accumulation of US ﬁnan-
cial assets in foreign portfolios, particularly in the balance
sheets of some emerging economies’ central banks (China,
India, Brazil, Russia, etc.); (iii) other relevant accompany-
ing facts, such as high expenditure, both private and public,
accompanied by low saving rates in the US and high saving
rates in the developing countries; a tendency for emerg-
ing economies to peg their currencies to the US dollar,
etc.
∗ Tel.: +39 081 7613480/675050; fax: +39 081 675014.
E-mail address: costabil@unina.it.
1 For an early diagnosis see Godley (1995).
Long-run remedies to this unbalanced situation have
been under scrutiny for some years. The unwinding of
global imbalances, it has been argued, may imply what is
commonly deﬁned as a “hard landing” (Roubini and Setser,
2005), as a consequenceof international capitalﬂowsrever-
sal and reduced saving inﬂows in the US. In turn, economic
adjustment in theUSvia interest rate effects,wealth effects,
and substantial dollar depreciation may impose serious
costs on other economies, given the role of the US econ-
omy as the world’s “engine of growth”. Consequently, in
order to avoid these risks, countries get stuck in a sort of
suboptimal equilibrium, to the point that some observers
have depicted the international situation as a “balance of
ﬁnancial terror” (Summers, 2004).
More recently, as “the US and European banking system
collapsed before the balance of ﬁnancial terror collapsed”
(Setser, 2008), the debate has turned on the issue whether
and how the worldwide crisis may be related to global
imbalances. Many commentators consider that persistent
global imbalances, coupled with unsatisfactory risk man-
agement and ﬁnancial deregulation, had a role to play in
0954-349X/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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the genesis of the crisis (for a synthesis of this debate, see,
among others, Setser, 2008; Dooley et al., 2009). Conse-
quently, many have advocated a “new Bretton Woods”, in
order to curb or reduce global imbalances by redesigning
the architecture of the international monetary system.
In order to clarify someof the issues involved in this pos-
sible reform, this article proposes a “logical experiment”,
illustrating how two alternative systems of international
paymentsmay produce opposite results in the global econ-
omy. In the current organisation, “key currencies” work as
international money. Keynes, by contrast, proposed that
this role should be assigned to a supranational money.2
The main objective of the article is to ask whether the
phenomenon of global imbalances could have developed
within the Keynesian setting and, consequently, whether
this scheme may still – at least in principle – provide use-
ful remedies for this type of international disequilibria. On
this basis, this article investigates the logic of a possible
plan aimed at introducing “structural change” in interna-
tional monetary arrangements, along the lines suggested
by Keynes.
This will be done in two stages. Firstly, Section 2 inves-
tigates whether the mechanisms built into our current
international monetary arrangements may generate some
of the imbalances referred to above. Secondly, Section 3
applies the remedies envisaged by the “Keynes Plan” to this
source of international disequilibrium, and tries to assess
their implications for current global imbalances. Section 4
concludes.
As Keynes himself suggested, it is not easy to disen-
tangle the basic logic and the technical provisions of his
plan from the speciﬁc type of disequilibrium characteris-
ing the international economy in the 1940s (Keynes, 1971,
fromnowonKCW, vol. 25, p. 24). But it seems interesting to
enquirewhether – in spite of the relevant changes that have
occurred since then (as illustrated in Section 3 below) – the
structural reform that he proposed, together with the reg-
ulations and the adjustment rules that he devised,may still
apply to the imbalanceswhichwe face today and, thus,may
have a more universal range of application than is usually
thought.
2. Global imbalances and key currencies
Because international payments are organised under
the explicit or implicit regulations of an internationalmon-
etary system, internationalmonetary rules are one possible
source of international imbalances, which is worth inves-
2 The proposed international money (called the “bancor”) is deﬁned
“supranational” as it would be used in international payments, without
also being the national currency of any individual country. Correspond-
ingly, the bank issuing the bancor, called the International Clearing Bank,
would be a supranational body. The bancor would be different from such
currencies as the euro, because in the Keynes Plan individual countries
would retain their ownnational currencies for internal purposes, and the ban-
cor would only work for international payments. On the other hand, groups
of countries may be willing to form currency unions within the interna-
tional systemproposed by Keynes (KCW, 25, pp. 55 ff.). Other authors have
adopted the word “supranational” in the sense adhered to in the present
article: among others Keynes, KCW vol. 25, p. 38, point E.2; Alessandrini,
2007, sec 3.2; Davidson, 1992–1993, p. 157; Endres, 2005, chapter 6.
tigating in details, and in isolation from other possible
causes.
Why is a monetary economy different from a barter
economy? The basic reason is that an international
means of payments allows the international economy to
develop into a system of multilateral, rather than bilateral
exchanges, as the international currency is a liquid asset,
i.e., one accepted at low transactions costs.3 This has both
advantages and disadvantages. Advantages include well-
known efﬁciency gains, as a “double coincidence of wants”
is not needed in a monetary economy. However, the exis-
tence of money may be a potential factor of disequilibrium
in international transactions, depending on the nature of
the international currency.
In principle, a variety of means of payment can func-
tion as the international money (gold, national currencies,
etc.). Different consequences arise depending upon the
speciﬁc medium performing this role. This is the crucial
pointwhere thecurrent internationalmonetary systemand
Keynes’s CurrencyUnion systempart company. This section
explores theworking of the internationalmonetary system
(or “non-system”, as Williamson, 1977, deﬁned it), as it is
organised to day. The characters of the alternative organisa-
tion under the provisions of the Keynes Plan, which will be
exploredmore thoroughly in the next section, are signalled
here at the appropriate junctures.
In the current organisation of international payments,
the national currencies of some individual countries work
as the international money.4 Keynes, by contrast, proposed
that the international money should be a supranational
money, issued by a supranational agency. This is the basic
structural reform proposed in his Plan.
National currencies working as international money
have been sometimes called “key currencies”, and “key
countries” are the nations issuing them (Williams, 1937,
1949).5 I will use this terminology in what follows.
Historically, key currency systems have functioned
under the alternative regimes of convertibility and incon-
vertibility. Under a gold exchange standard regime, a
national currency is accepted as a substitute for gold,
since the issuing country promises “convertibility”, i.e., it
promises to convert into gold any amount of its own cur-
rency, on demand, at a ﬁxed rate. Alternatively, a national
currency may work as the international money with-
out promising convertibility into gold, or any other ﬁxed
anchor. This has been the case with the US dollar ever since
the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreements in the1970s,
when the international system effectively evolved from a
3 Amultilateral barter system is possible in principle, but of course such
a Walrasian concept is hardly realistic.
4 Classic references are Cohen, 1971; McKinnon, 1979; Kindleberger,
1981; Aliber, 1982; Krugman, 1984.
5 Williams’ “key currency approach” was formulated in the 1930s (in
1932–33, if not before: James, 1996, p. 65 and 628, fn. 12). Williams’ Plan
appeared in Spring 1943. According to several authors (James, 1996, pp.
65–66; Meltzer, 2003, p. 585; Asso and Fiorito, 2004), the key currency
ideagraduallywonapproval, andﬁnally “wonout” over theKeynes and the
White Plans in the factual implementation of the Bretton Woods system.
Without being concerned with the details of Williams’ Plan, I borrow his
term “key currency” as a short name for the national currency serving as
the international money.
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dollar-gold standard regime into a dollar standard. But the
essential point to stress at this stage is that, both with and
without convertibility, the international currency comes into
existence as the debt of the banking system of a K country.
An international monetary system based upon key
currencies is asymmetric. As a ﬁrst approximation, this
happens because international liquidity remains depen-
dent on the policies of the issuing countries, either because
of their control over large gold reserves, to which they
promise to give access via convertibility, or because key
currencies function as ﬁat money, as it happens in the post-
Bretton Woods era. The asymmetric nature of key currency
regimeswill emergemore clearly from the following analy-
sis of the asymmetries generated by its working. In order to
focus on the basic logic of the argument, it is assumed here
that the world is inhabited by one key country (K), issu-
ing the key currency (KC), and one J country issuing “own
currency”. However, reference is made to a multiplicity of J
countries in the illustrating historical examples.
The following six points illustrate the asymmetries of
key currency systems.
(1) The international currency is widely used in inter-
national transactions, as the currency in which
payments are made (vehicle currency), and in which
the countries’ imports are quoted (quotation cur-
rency). Also, it becomes widely used in international
lending–borrowing contracts, bothof the short- and the
long-term variety.
The role of key currencies as “reserve currencies” nat-
urally follows fromtheirpivotal roleas the international
means of payment: because of non-synchronisation of
international sales and purchases, individual countries
need to accumulate international reserves, just as an
individual agent keeps a reserve of purchasing power in
the form of “liquid” assets for transaction and precau-
tionary purposes. Thus, central banks “institutionally”
need to keep reserves in KC denominated assets. Other
motivations may also be at work: ﬁrstly, countries
different from the key countries, particularly if they
are developing or emerging economies, have strong
incentives to accumulate reserves in order to avoid an
appreciation of their national currencies (KC depreci-
ation) for competitiveness reasons. Moreover, central
banks’ precautionary demand may rise in periods of
turbulence in ﬁnancial markets, as they buy reserves as
an insurance device against speculative attacks. These
motivations may have comparatively different weights
in different historical periods; but, irrespective of the
changing importance of these alternative motivations,
what emerges is the necessity, for any country that is
not a “key” country, to buy KC-denominated reserves.6
6 The need to accumulate foreign reserves would disappear in an ideal
systemofperfectlyﬂexible exchange rates,whichwould substitutemarket
forces for central bank intervention in thedeterminationof exchange rates.
However, pure ﬂoating is more an abstraction than an accurate descrip-
tion of any existing exchange regime as, even after the breakdown of the
“BrettonWoods” system, a variety of exchange rate arrangements exists in
theworld (for a complete list of existing arrangements see, e.g., Appleyard
et al., 2006, 733–34). As the central banks of most countries are unwill-
Summing up, under the current international mon-
etary regime, the accumulation of KC-denominated
assets confers upon key countries “a leading role in
international affairs, with other countries holding their
reserves largely in those currencies” (James, 1996, p.
30).
Thus, in this monetary system, an international
(private and institutional) demand for the national cur-
rency of one country is generated. This confers upon
this country the asymmetric position of widely selling
its currency to the world. Because the national cur-
rency of the K country becomes generally adopted as
themeans of ﬁnal payment internationally, the country
is enabled to pay for its net imports (of goods, services
and/or ﬁnancial assets) by merely transferring claims
to deposits into its own banking system, including its
central bank, with no further action required to ﬁnally
settle these payments. In other words, as stated above,
the K country pays with the debt of its own banking
system.7 Country J is not in a position to do the same,
since its own currency – not being an international cur-
rency – is worthless for country K.
By contrast, the logic of the Keynes Plan does not con-
template this privileged position for any national country;
in particular, it does not contemplate the holding, in cen-
tral banks’ portfolios, of foreign countries’ currencies as
reserves.
(2) Country K may be viewed as the provider of “the public
good of international money”, although a more realis-
tic interpretation is that K provides “the private good
for itself of seignorage, which is the proﬁt that comes
to the signeur, or sovereign power, from the issuance of
money” (Kindleberger, 1981, p. 248). Thus, the world
demand for the international currency confers upon
countryK theadvantageof commandingpartof country
J’s product via seignorage: the international monetary
system has a built-in mechanism whereby goods are
transferred from country J to country K.
This asymmetry is absent from the Keynes Plan, since
in its logic no “foreign currency” provides interna-
tional services as a key currency and reserve asset. The
supranational nature of the international money excludes
seignorage accruing to any country.
ing to allow complete ﬂexibility in their exchange rates, they keep large
amounts of reserves, mostly in foreign exchange and, to a large extent, in
dollars. Some countries, such as China, have been pegging their curren-
cies to the US dollar, thus re-creating a ﬁxed-exchange rate regime. Thus,
evenwhen full account is taken of the discontinuities between the Bretton
Woods system and the one prevailing afterwards, it would be inaccurate
to dismiss the role of foreign reserves and foreign exchange intervention.
To give an idea of the importance of this fact and its order of magnitude:
the reserves held by monetary authorities did not fall with the end of
Bretton Woods, and they totalled 6,931,372 (average over the ﬁrst three
trimesters) in 2008, equivalent to 11 percent of world projected GDP for
the same year (source: IMF, COFER, 2008). The share of US denominated
reserve holdings was 70 percent in 2001, but fell afterwards (Galati and
Wooldridge, 2008, p. 7).
7 Thismay be a case of “lack of payment ﬁnality”where “payment ﬁnal-
ity” is taken to mean the instant when “a seller of a good, or service, or
anotherasset, receives somethingofequalvalue fromthepurchaser,which
leaves the seller with no further claim on the buyer” (Goodhart, 1989, p.
26; see also Rossi, 2007).
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(3) K’s reliance on J’s demand for its money makes its
expansionary monetary policies relatively easy and
convenient, so that the country is able to ﬁnance its
demand ﬂows towards the rest of the world, for both
consumption and investment purposes.
To see why the constraint on its monetary policy
is relaxed for country K, consider that, in any other
country, the liquidity of its central bank (namely, its
willingness to re-discount private assets such as com-
mercial bills) is not unlimited, given the possibility
of incurring international payments difﬁculties, since
it has to make some payments in foreign curren-
cies. This constraint does not bite on K’s central bank,
because the K currency is accepted internationally as
the means of ﬁnal payment and reserve management.
Consequently, country K may become prone to ﬁnance
systematic current account deﬁcits with the interna-
tionalmoney.Althoughalternativechoicesareavailable
(as illustrated by the historical experience of other key
countries, including England in the XIX century), in the
post-World War II period large current account deﬁcits
started in 1982 and have been a constant feature of the
US economy since then (with the exception of 1991),
hitting an all-time high of 6.5 percent of GDP in 2006
(IMF, 2007).
Deﬁcitsmust bematchedby corresponding surpluses
in J countries. As the world economy grows, it is ben-
eﬁcial for all if the international means of payments
grow correspondingly, thereby preventing liquidity
constraints on international transactions. The expan-
sion of international liquidity contributes to export-led
growth in J countries, because their current account
surpluses are on the other side of K’s deﬁcit. They
accordinglybeneﬁt as a result. But theyarenot in aposi-
tion todowhatKdoes, namely to issue the international
money to pay for their deﬁcits.
By contrast, under the provisions of the Keynes Plan,
the external constraint on monetary policies would bite
equally for all countries, because no national currency
would work as the international currency, and also
because the Plan’s rules and regulations would apply
neutrally to all the countries involved in the scheme.
(4) An export-led model of growth may have ambiguous
effects on the welfare of J’s citizens (see also point
5 below, about the direction of saving ﬂows). On the
one hand, exports may stimulate multiplier effects
on income and employment. On the other hand,
export-led growth may come at the expense domestic
expenditures, as the country substitutes foreign for
domestic demand. This substitutionmay requirewage-
restraint, the compression of domestic consumption
and of welfare-oriented government expenditures and,
more generally, severe ﬁscal policies (as expansionary
ﬁscal policies may crowd out exports, either directly
or via their impact on domestic consumption). By
contrast, in country K expansionary ﬁscal policies may
haveauseful role toplay, as theymayhelpoffsetting the
downward pressure on domestic production exerted by
the country’s high propensity to import (or, in a long-
run perspective, by the high income-elasticity of its
imports).
By contrast, Keynes’s Currency Union does not stim-
ulate these asymmetric ﬁscal propensities. Because all
countries would be induced (by the Plan’s regulations
and, at a deeper level, by the equal international standing
of their national currencies) not to run systematically
unbalanced current accounts, they would neither need to
systematically compress domestic demand below domes-
tic production (as surplus countries do), nor would they
experience a downward pressure on domestic production
(as deﬁcit countries do).
(5) Asset accumulation by country J is reﬂected in net
external debt accumulation by country K, because this
country can ﬁnance its current account deﬁcit only by
borrowing from country J, as the well-known funda-
mental balance of payments identity makes clear.8
But, beyond these accounting identities, it is inter-
esting to notice that one important economic channel
for the accumulation of K’s external debt is central
banks’ behaviour, as it is more convenient for J’s cen-
tral bank to invest its reserves, rather than keep them
barren in its vaults. Jacques Rueff provided a vivid
illustration of this process in the course of a very inter-
esting exchange with Fred Hirsch, about ﬁfty years
ago:
“What is the essence of the regime, and what is its
difference from the gold standard? It is that when
a country with a key currency has a deﬁcit in its
balance of payments – that is to say, the United
States, for example – it pays the creditor country
dollars, which end up in its central bank. But the
dollars are of no use in Bonn, or in Tokyo, or in
Paris. The very same day, they are relent to the
New York money market, so that they return to
the place of origin. Thus the debtor country does
not lose what the creditor country has gained. So
the key-currency country never feels the effect of
a deﬁcit in its balance of payments. And the main
consequences is that there is no reason whatever
for the deﬁcit to disappear, because it does not
appear.
Let me be more positive: if I had an agree-
ment with my tailor that whatever money I pay
8 By deﬁnition: Current Account +ﬁnancial account =0 (for simplicity,
and without loss of generality, we are ignoring “capital account” trans-
actions, which register such items as international donations and are
generally very small). The deﬁnitional balance between a current account
deﬁcit and a ﬁnancial capital surplus follows from the rules of double-
entry bookkeeping, since any international transaction is registered twice
in the balance of payments, once as a credit and once as a debit. For exam-
ple,whenaUScitizenbuysgoods fromaresidentof country J, herpurchase
is registered as a debit (negative sign) in the US current account. The other
side to this transaction is that, as the foreign seller receives a dollar cheque
in payment, he pays the cheque in his account at Bank X in the US, thus
buying an US asset (the bank deposit), which may later end up in the cen-
tral bank of country J. Selling assets to foreigners means borrowing from
them. Thus, a current account deﬁcit is alwaysmatched by an equal ﬁnan-
cial account surplus, which amounts to a corresponding debt of country K
towards country J. The interested reader is referred to any good interna-
tional economics textbook for further details (e.g., Appleyard et al., 2006).
This, of course, does not cancel the advantages conferred on the K country
by the special international status of its currency.
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him he returns to me the very same day as a
loan, I would have no objection at all to ordering
more suits from him” (Rueff and Hirsch, 1965, p.
3).
In the Bretton Woods era, European countries played
the role of J countries, which other countries sub-
sequently inherited, and will probably pass to other
countries in the future (Dooley et al., 2003). But
the “essence of the regime” has not changed under
this respect.9 Because of the very “special interna-
tional status of the US dollar” (Bernanke, 2005),
capital still ﬂows from country J to country K, with
the further advantage that the ensuing downward
pressure on interest rates may stimulate growth in
K, if the country so wishes. By contrast, domestic
savings in J are diverted from domestic invest-
ment.
Some scholars consider a disturbing paradox the
fact that country J (i.e., the “poor” or develop-
ing country) is lending to K, and not vice-versa.
In recent discussions of the US external position
this point has been made by Roubini (2005) and
the same point was previously made by Trifﬁn
(1984).
But, to some extent, this paradox is a result of the
working of the international monetary system: there
is a possibility built in this system for country K to
sustain the borrower/debtor position, because of the
international status of its national currency and the
consequent capital inﬂows so vividly illustrated by
Rueff.
To sum up: owing to the very “special interna-
tional status of the US dollar” (Bernanke, 2005),
resources ﬂows from J countries (where they could
be devoted to domestic investment, consumption
and/or welfare expenditures) into country K. Coun-
try J is in a less fortunate position, since country
K’s central bank has no incentive to buy J’s cur-
rency.
These disturbing paradoxes would disappear under
the Keynes Plan, because no special international
status would be bestowed on any national cur-
rency.
(6) For systematic borrowers, external debt may become
unsustainable, if the debt/GDP ratio rises above some
target level. However, this constraint does not apply to
all countries symmetrically. One possible remedy for
indebted K countries is capital gains from exchange
rate adjustments. Country K beneﬁts from a depreci-
ation in its currency not simply because depreciation
improves its competitiveness, but also by improv-
ing the country’s net foreign position, via “valuation
effects”.
9 There are important discontinuities between the Bretton Woods and
the current international system, as Barry Eichengreen (2007) has pointed
out. However, here we call attention to one common feature, namely the
asymmetric power enjoyed by the K country, in that its currency is the
international currency, and consequently it becomes indebted in its own
currency.
On the one hand, a depreciation of the interna-
tional currency increases the value of country K’s
holdings of foreign assets. On the other hand, for-
eign creditors bought assets denominated in the key
currency before its depreciation. Consequently, they
now incur a loss, which is obscured, but not elim-
inated, by the fact that the value of a unit of the
K currency is still worth one unit after depreciation
(and, consequently, the nominal value of K’s liabili-
ties is unchanged). Valuation effects determine a net
wealth transfer from the rest of the world to country
K, similarly to what happens in the national econ-
omy with the “doctoring of past contracts” between
debtors and creditors, and towhat used to happenwith
the “debasement” of the national money by indebted
sovereigns10 (for other destabilising consequences of
exchange rate adjustments see McKinnon and Schnabl,
2006). By contrast, should a depreciation of country
J’s currency occur, this would imply an increasing bur-
den of its external debt. The underlying reason is that,
because of the special international status of its cur-
rency, country K’s debt is typically denominated in its
own currency while J’s debt is typically denominated
in country K’s currency. The inability of J countries
to issue debt denominated in their own currencies
(labelled the “original sin” by Eichengreen et al., 2003)
thus implies an asymmetric effect of currency deval-
uations on the external position of the two types of
countries.
This asymmetry could not materialize in the Currency
Union scheme, where countries would all stand on a
par in their international status. Moreover, as explicitly
stated by Keynes, they could become debtors and credi-
tors towards the International Bank as a whole, but not
towards each other. Consequently, changes in exchange
rates would not result in international redistributions of
wealth.
The distinction between “Bretton Woods” and the cur-
rent regime is relevant in this context. In “Bretton Woods”,
the US dollar had an “anchor”, gold. This anchor imposed
some degree of discipline on US external imbalances,
although it may be disputed how much this constraint
was biting in reality (Harrod, for instance, deﬁned the gold
exchange standard under Bretton Woods as “inconvertibil-
ity by gentlemen’s agreement”; quoted in Trifﬁn, 1965). In
the post-Bretton Woods system, with inconvertibility, dis-
cipline effects vanish altogether. Consequently, country K
may become even more willing to run sustained external
deﬁcits.
A closely related point can be made concerning the dis-
tinction between ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes,
which in the XXth century have been coupled with cap-
10 The expression “doctoring of past contracts” is due to Pigou (1927,
p. 230). For studies of these and other distributional effects in closed
economies see Costabile (2004, 2005). As to “debasement”, thewritings of
Neapolitan monetary economists in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
tury are useful reading. For a study of how stability of contractual terms
couldbeobtainedvia “imaginarymoney” seeQuadrioCurzio andScazzieri
(2008).
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ital controls and “perfect” capital mobility respectively.
Under the former regime, a fall in the dollar’s external
value required that the countries involved should agree
to a formal realignment of parities. This usually required
complex and costly negotiations, which to a certain extent
can be reduced under ﬂexible exchange rates. In the latter
regime, the growing recognition of the need for a devalua-
tion of the dollar could spark a ﬂight from the dollar, thus
facilitating external adjustment as described above. Thus,
capital mobility and ﬂexible exchange rates may them-
selves reduce discipline on K countries.
The US has been a net debtor country since the
beginning of the 1980s, and valuation effects played a sub-
stantial role in the last decades, by contributing to 30%
of the nation’s ﬁnancial adjustment (Gourinchas and Rey,
2005).11
Summing up: in this section, one of the origins of
the global imbalances currently characterising the world
economyhasbeen tracedback to thebasic rulesof the inter-
national monetary system, and, more precisely, to the role
played by key currencies as international currencies.
Thus, the next questions are: are there alternative mon-
etary arrangements thatmay be substituted for the current
“key currency” system? Speciﬁcally: would the world look
different under the Keynes Plan?Would a “Keynesian inter-
national balance” be desirable? The next section tries to
answer these questions.
3. International balance and the ‘Keynes Plan’
By international balance, Keynes meant something dif-
ferent from a “balance of ﬁnancial terror”. He deﬁned
“internationalbalance”as a situationwherecountries avoid
systematic deﬁcits or surpluses in their current accounts,
and capital ﬂowsare reduced to aminimum(KCW,25, p. 31;
see De Cecco, 1979). It should be obvious that international
balance in Keynes’s sense has nothing to dowith autarky or
otherwise restricted commercial ﬂows between countries.
What he regarded as undesirable was the systematic polar-
isation between countries running surpluses and deﬁcits
respectively, and the recurring need for painful interna-
tional adjustment. This preoccupation is in line with what
many authors have expressed with regard to the present
situation.
Keynes regarded the achievement of his type of inter-
national balance as the main objective of the Clearing
Union scheme, that he proposed in order to shape the
11 Gourinchas and Rey (2005, p. 27)wondered “why the rest of theworld
would ﬁnance the US current account defcit and hold US assets, know-
ing that those assets will under-perform”. Luo-Ping, a director-general at
the China Banking Regulatory Commission, has now provided a delayed
but precise answer to this question. As reported by the Financial Times
(February 11, 2009): “Mr Luo, whose English tends towards the colloquial,
added: ‘We hate you guys. Once you start issuing $1 trillion-$2 trillion
[$1,000bn-$2,000bn]...we know the dollar is going to depreciate, so we
hate you guys but there is nothing much we can do.’ However, Mr Luo said
Chinese ofﬁcials would encourage its banks to ﬁnance domestic mergers
and acquisitions rather than provide rescue ﬁnance to distressed ﬁnancial
companies in other countries: ‘There will be no bottom-ﬁshing of ﬁnan-
cial institutions, particularly in theUS, because there is a lot of uncertainty
about the quality of the books’.”
international monetary arrangements for the new age
of peace following World War II. To reach international
balance, Keynes devised a sophisticated international cur-
rency scheme, designed for taming conﬂicting national
interests. This section tries to assesswhether the basic logic
of the Keynes Plan may apply to, and provide remedies
for, international imbalances under more general circum-
stances than those facing the world economy in the 1940s,
and particularly for the imbalances that we are confronting
to day.12 This analysis, provides insights that may prove
useful in the ongoing debate over themeaning and purpose
of international monetary reform.
This is obviously not an easy task. Keynes himself
explained that: “Unfortunately, the technical task by which
a state of international balance can be maintained once
it has been reached, is made vastly more difﬁcult by the
circumstance that we start out from an existing state of
extreme disequilibrium” (KCW, 25, p. 24). For our present
purposes, this implies that the logic of the Plan has to be
“disentangled” from the speciﬁc characters of the interna-
tional disequilibriumof the1940s, and that some important
changes in the international scenario should be brieﬂy sig-
nalled, before we can try and disclose its more universal
implications.
Firstly, the international positions of some countries
have been reversed, with the US, for example, being the
creditor country at the time, in contrast with its role as
the main debtor country to day. Britain was then one of
the main debtors, and Keynes’s defence of British interests
inﬂuenced his emphasis on the necessity that creditors
should share with debtors the burden of international
adjustment. Secondly, the world was facing speciﬁc prob-
lems in the aftermath of World War II, such as the need to
reconstruct Europe after wartime disruptions. At the ﬁnan-
cial level, the hot issue was the need to face the “scarce
currency” problem (as the dollar then was) and, more gen-
erally, to prevent international liquidity constraints from
curbing economic reconstruction and growth.13 Thirdly,
most economists, including Keynes, were still recovering
from the shock of the world depression of the Thirties, and
thought that the main task facing the designers of the new
international monetary order was to prevent the interna-
tional transmission of deﬂationary impulses, while in fact
an inﬂationary bias prevailed in the world economy in the
following decades. Fourthly, the post-war ﬁnancial archi-
tecturewas seenbymanyas theproductofAnglo-American
wartime alliance (James, 1996) and there are hints that
Keynes himself indulged to a vision of the Clearing Union
as an institution to be dominated by a balance between
12 The different drafts of the Plan are considered here as a coherent
whole, unless otherwise noticed. However, because Keynes’s thinking
about “future currency agreements” started in 1940, and did not stop at
least until the Bretton Woods agreements were signed in 1944, his plan
underwent several changes. These were a result of both evolving circum-
stances, and extensive exchanges with colleagues, Treasury and Bank of
England ofﬁcials, British politicians, and, later, with the American delega-
tion. The evolution of the Keynes’ Plan can be traced in KCW, vol. 25; see
also: Harrod (1951); Horseﬁeld (1969); Kahn (1976) in Thirlwall (1976);
James (1996); Moggridge (1992); Skidelsky (2003).
13 For an analytical scheme–drawing on Bresciani Turroni–for interpret-
ing these post-World War II problems, see Costabile (2008).
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Anglo-American interests.14 Finally, Keynes at Bretton
Woods was thinking in terms of a managed exchange rate
regime, if not ﬁxed-exchange rates, while ﬂexible exchange
rates prevail to day between many countries. It is obvious
that exchange rate management and central bank co-
operation would indeed be required in order to implement
any international currency scheme, whether Keynesian or
otherwise conceived of. For instance, as argued by Robert
Mundell (a strong supporter of a plan aimed at introducing
a “world currency”), such a plan should start off with
coordinated intervention by the leading central banks for
stabilizing exchange rates (Mundell, 2005).15
In spite of the unavoidable historical roots and con-
ditioning of the Keynes Plan, its basic logic survives the
speciﬁc purposes pursued by his author in the 1940s. This
can be seen by looking at its objectives, at its principles and
technical devices and,ﬁnally, bydeveloping its implications
for the present state of the world economy.
3.1. Objectives
The objective of the Plan was that of “devising a system
by which a state of international balance may be main-
tained once it has been reached” (KCW, v. 25, p. 24, 1st
draft). In this situation economies or, better, groups of
economies16 would avoid systematic unbalances in their
external accounts. Although itmight be impossible in prac-
tice to eradicate international imbalances completely, the
international monetary system should work so as to curb,
rather than amplify, their emergence.
One reason why a “Keynesian international balance”
is desirable is that, in such a situation, every country (or
group of countries) would tend to live within the lim-
its set by its own resources. This feature of Keynes’s plan
has relevant welfare (and, possibly, political) implications.
On the one hand countries, freed from the need to run
systematic external surpluses, would be freed from this
powerful incentive to pursue aggressive commercial poli-
cies, such as those broadly deﬁned as Mercantilist. Hence,
domestic resources could be devoted to the satisfaction of
citizens’ needs, and Governments would be free to pur-
sue the domestic objectives of “providing continuous good
14 The new Bank should come into existence at the initiative of the US
and the UK as “joint founders of the Club”, so that these two countries
could “settle the charter and the main details of the new body without
being subjected to the delays and confused counsels of an international
conference”. . .“I conceive of the management and the effective voting
power as being permanently Anglo-American” (KCW, vol. 25, p. 54–55,
Second Draft; see also pp. 73–74, 3rd draft). However, it is well known
that there was a degree of conﬂict between the US and Britain (Balogh,
1976; Skidelsky, 2003; Harcourt and Turnell, 2005).
15 Mundell (2005) also explains the general principles of central bank
intervention required to keep exchange rate speculation at bay. For space
reasons, I cannot enter a discussion of these principles here. Mundell, as
well as the proponents of a “supranational money” (including the present
author and, among others, Alessandrini and Fratianni, 2007) propose con-
certed supranational action to promote “monetary integration” in the
sense described by Trautwein (2004).
16 Keynes argued that “it would be preferable, if it were possible, that the
members [of the Clearing Union] should, in some cases at least, be groups
of countries rather than separate units” (e.g., North American countries,
South and Central America, the Sterling area. . . (KCW, 25, p. 56).
employment at a high standard of living” (KCW, 25, p. 27,
1st draft).17 Symmetrically, no country could run system-
atic deﬁcits, which would allow them to live “proﬂigately
beyond their means” (KCW, 25, p. 30; p. 272). Internal
resources would constrain alternative domestic goals. This
may eventually help nations to perceive more clearly the
trade-offs between alternatives (consumption, investment
and government expenditures, the latter either for welfare
purposes or for the ﬁnancing of wars). Possibly, the clear
perceptionof these trade-offswouldhelpcountries tomake
democratically accountable choices. Finally, the Plan also
made provisions for the needs of developing countries by
favouring regular ﬂows of investment from the developed
to the backward regions through an international invest-
ment board.18
Another important reason why a “Keynesian interna-
tional equilibrium” is desirable is that systematic external
surpluses and deﬁcits tend to destabilise the world econ-
omy,whether in a contractionist or an inﬂationist direction,
by facilitating the international transmissionof imbalances.
Keynes was mostly concerned with deﬂations, because he
had lived the experience of the 1920s and 1930s. He argued
that the surplus countries (as they then were), the US
and France, had imparted a “contractionist pressure” on
the world by sterilising their gold inﬂows, thus preventing
the increase in their international reserves from initiat-
ing a monetary expansion (KCW, 25, p. 273). The problem
was aggravated by capital ﬂights from deﬁcit to surplus
countries. This determined worldwide recession. Keynes
intended to substitute “an expansionist, in place of con-
tractionist, pressure on world trade” (KCW, vol. 25, p. 46,
2nd draft). His “Clearing Union Plan” can thus be consid-
ered as a means to achieve, via the international route, the
same full employment objectives that he also invocated in
the General Theory.
Contrary to Keynes’s expectations, after World War II
deﬂation failed to materialize. Ever after the initial period
of post-war reconstruction in Europe, the world witnessed
an expansion of international liquidity, which has been
interpreted by many scholars as the means for running US
payments deﬁcits (e.g., Eichengreen, 1996, pp. 115–116).
This imposed an expansionary impulse on the interna-
tional economy, both in the Bretton Woods and in the
post-Bretton Woods periods.
Although Keynes conceived of his Clearing Union sys-
tem mainly as a remedy for contractionist pressures, we
will see that the logic of his plan would curb the inter-
national transmission of both contractions and excessive
expansions, because its foundational principles and basic
provisions were such as to make both systematic surpluses
anddeﬁcits (i.e., onemajor causeof destabilizingpressures)
difﬁcult to run.
17 On the relation between “national self-sufﬁciency”, full employment
and domestic social policies in Keynes see also Skidelsky (2003) and Vines
(2003). On the implications for policies of social welfare of alternative
international monetary systems see Costabile and Scazzieri (2008).
18 The need for these international investment ﬂows was underlined,
for instance, by Kalecki and Schumacher (1943) in their comment on the
American and the British plans.
Author's personal copy
86 L. Costabile / Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 20 (2009) 79–89
3.2. Means
What kind of principles should underlie the inter-
national monetary system, and which technical devices
should be implemented to the purpose of curbing global
imbalances? Keynes proposed two basic principles: the
“Banking Principle” and what he deﬁned “one-way” gold
convertibility.
The logic of the Banking Principle implies that liq-
uidity should have the nature of credit money. Because
the transactions to be ﬁnanced through this medium are
international payments, the issuing institution should be a
supranational Bank, the International Clearing Bank (ICB),
whose establishment would be the task of the Interna-
tional Clearing Union, itself a supranational agency. Thus,
the international money would be the liability of the ICB,
not of any individual nation. Consequently, there would be
no demand for any “key currency” as the means for inter-
national payments and as a reserve asset in central banks’
portfolios. Actually, the need for holding ofﬁcial reserves
would disappear altogether (as “central banks would buy
and sell their own currencies among themselves only
against debits and credits to their accounts to the Clearing
Bank, designated Clearing accounts”, KCW, 25, p. 34).
The Banking Principle also excludes that the ICB may
become insolvent, as explained by Keynes (KCW, 25, p. 44):
“This principle is the necessary equality of credits and deb-
its, of assets and liabilities. If no credits can be removed
outside the banking system but only transferred within it,
the bank itself can never be in difﬁculties. It can with safety
make what advances it wishes to any of its customers with
the assurance that the proceeds can only be transferred to
the bank account of another customer”.
The logic of the Banking Principle implies that bank
money should be created as overdraft facilities. Keynes’s
international money (called the bancor) would be created
by means of overdraft facilities provided by the ICB to the
central banks of the adhering countries (member banks),
each of them having a claim to overdraw according to its
own “index quota”. Quotas, which would represent a claim
to borrow at the ICB, would be proportional to (speciﬁcally,
one half of) the average of each country’s total trade for the
previous ﬁve years. These rules would be agreed upon by
all countries entering the Union, and would equally apply
to all of them. No country would be favoured or discrim-
inated against, each falling under these quota regulations,
which would determine the creation of international liq-
uidity. Rules, rather than national discretion, would be the
norm for the creation of international liquidity.19
As iswell known, creditmoney is createdwhen an agent
enters a debit relation with the bank. Under the Plan’s
provisions, this could only happen when a deﬁcit coun-
try borrowed from the ICB in order to ﬁnance its excess
demand for a foreign currency. Consequently, one implica-
tion of the Plan is that balancing transactions between any
two countries would not result in the creation of interna-
19 In his third drafts Keynes moved somewhat towards discretion,
although mostly in the penalties to be inﬂicted on countries in external
disequilibrium (Moggridge, 1992, p. 677).
tional liquidity, as they would simply be cleared between
the central banks concerned, operating on their accounts
with the ICB.20 In practice, a deﬁcit countrywould settle its
balancebywithdrawingpartsof itsoverdraft facilities, up to
themaximum limit set by its index quota. Correspondingly,
surplus countries would accumulate unused overdrafts.
Because deposits of bank money (credits and debits)
would be created by external deﬁcits and surpluses, and
extinguished by their liquidation, international liquidity
would be absolutely elastic, i.e., automatically adjusted
to the needs of trade. Consequently, home production
and employment would be activated in response to for-
eign demand for the country’s product, which would be
ﬁnanced by the ICB (according to the principle of endoge-
nousmoney) just as, in the national economy, the domestic
banking system would ﬁnance production elastically. As
Keynes noticed in his “comparative analysis of the British
project for a ClearingUnion (C.U.) and the American project
for a Stabilisation Fund (S.F.): “In C.U. the quota changespari
passu with the volume of foreign trade. This has the great
advantage that the volume of new international currency
outstanding is a function of the volume of trade which it is
required to ﬁnance” (KCW, vol. 25, p. 217).21 Thus, the logic
of the Banking Principle, applied to the international econ-
omy, responds to Keynes’s desideratum that contractionist
pressures on the international economy, arising from liq-
uidity constraints, should be avoided (KCW, 25, p. 140; p.
160).
But the Plan also included measures apt to curb the
opposite typepressure, i.e., inﬂationary pressures.22 Firstly,
no country adhering to the scheme could enjoy the relaxed
external constraint that K countries enjoy in the current
system (see Section 2, point (3) above). Secondly, the ﬁrm
anchorage of overdrafts allocated to each country to the
volume of its average trade in the previous ﬁve years
would prevent the system from creating liquidity with-
out limits. Thirdly, the Plan also included other speciﬁc
measures exerting a strong pressure on countries to avoid
running international imbalances for protracted periods
of time. Indeed, against the danger that countries may
acquiesce to, or willingly run, deﬁcits and surpluses by
becoming indebted to the ICU, the Plan introduced severe
discipline devices on debtors and creditors, operating via
both credit rations and price incentives. Debtors could only
borrow within the maximum limit set by their index quo-
tas, and only at rising interest rates; creditors would be
20 When a member of the public of one country (e.g., Britain) demands
a foreign currency (e.g., dollars) to pay for a speciﬁed purpose, it makes
an application to the bank of England through its bank. “The balances due
to or from any foreign state will be cleared between the central banks
concerned, operating on their accounts with the ICB” (Keynes, 25, p. 61).
21 See also KCW, 25, p. 140: “Mr. Keynes, in reply to a question as to
how these proposals differed from the old theory of the gold standard,
remarked that. . . The quantity of bancor was absolutely elastic and in fact
the proposal substituted bank money for gold, which would not in future
limit the amount of money there would be” (Minutes of a meeting of the
War cabinet Committee on Reconstruction Problems, 31 March 1942).
22 The accusation was raised by American bankers that the Keynes Plan
would be inﬂationary. Paradoxically, the same accusation had been raised
by American bankers against the gold exchange standard in the 1920s. For
an interesting interpretation of their motivations see De Cecco (1976).
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required to transfer to the Union any surplus above their
quota, and also to pay charges to the Union if their credits
exceeded one quarter of these quotas. Thus, the regulation
of international liquidity and the prevention of interna-
tional disequilibria would effectively go hand in hand in
the logic of the Keynes Plan, and curb both inﬂationary and
deﬂationary pressures.
The second Principle of the Keynes Plan, namely one-
way gold convertibility, is of interest mainly in a historical
perspective, rather than with a view to current proposals
for reforming the international monetary system. Never-
theless, for completeness, we will consider it brieﬂy. This
Principle implied that goldwouldplay a rather peculiar role
in this scheme. While the bancor would be “expressed” or
“deﬁned” in terms of a unit of gold (KCW, 25, p. 34; p. 183),
central banks would not be allowed to withdraw gold paid
into the ICU. Hence, gold would in fact gradually exit the
international circulation and member banks’ reserves.23
This aspect of the Keynes Plan has not passed unnoticed.
Commentators have rightly argued that Keynes’s purpose
was to demonetise gold, the aim being to remove the
incentives for central banks to hoard it (Skidelsky, 2003,
p. 677–678; James, 1996, p. 36). This is coherent with these
authors’ interpretations, focusing on the anti-deﬂationary
objectives that Keynes was pursuing in the 1940s, and on
his defence of the interests of debtor countries, as Britain
then was.24
This interpretation is perfectly valid from an histori-
cal point of view, and perfectly responding to Keynes’s
own declared purposes: because creditors countries had
imparted a deﬂationary pressure on the world economy by
sterilising gold inﬂows, the ﬁrst thing to do was to make
their “liquidity preference” vacuous, by removing gold, the
material object of their desires, form the international cir-
culation. In this sense, gold was to be demonetised by ﬁat.
I subscribe to this interpretation as far as it goes. How-
ever, these interpretershave relativelyunderrated theother
side of the Plan, relating to the role of national curren-
cies, which is of interest for the purposes of reforming
international monetary arrangements as they exist to day.
The Plan in fact envisaged a double demonetisation: what
had to exit the international circulation and reserves was
not just gold, but also any national currency which may
otherwise come to assume the role of the international
money. National currencies, while retaining their role as
the medium of domestic payments, would be demonetised
(from the point of view of the international circulation),
because the demand for these currencies as international
currencies was to be abolished by ﬁat.
23 Robertson, commenting on this aspect of the Clearing Union Plan,
illustrated with his usual cuteness the vanishing role of gold as a reserve
asset: “A gold reservewhich can never be paid out to anyone (except prob-
ably the International Bank of Mars) is an odd thought, but probably the
right reductio ad absurdum” (KCW, vol. 25, p. 67: letter from Robertson to
Keynes 27November 1941). In the logic of the Plan, the gold reserves of the
entire global economy would eventually converge into the ICB’s vaults. As
to the uses towhich thismass of gold could then be put, Keynes suggested
international aid.
24 Crotty’s (1983, p. 62) interpretation also stresses the anti-deﬂationary
objectives of the Keynes Plan.
“Key currencies” were to be a logical impossibility, and
the international monetary system, for these reasons, was
to be absolutely symmetric.
The symmetry property of the Keynes Plan has been
noticed by some interpreters, and attributed to the provi-
sionofpenaltiesboth fordebtors andcreditors, asdiscussed
above (James, 1996, p. 36–37). But these interpretations,
in my opinion, fail to put sufﬁcient emphasis on the cir-
cumstance that the asymmetries, so to speak, would be
cut at their roots: not only would international imbalances
(as they normally arise between symmetric countries) be
discouraged by means of the above mentioned penalties;
most importantly, what would be disempowered is the
basic source of international imbalances as described in
Section 2, i.e., the basic asymmetry between countries issu-
ing the international money and countries deprived of this
privilege.
Summingup, themonetary systemenvisaged byKeynes
is symmetric for three reasons, i.e., because: (i) the link
between gold and international liquidity is severed, in
the sense that the distribution of international liquid-
ity becomes independent from the distribution of gold
reserves among countries; (ii) national currencies stand on
a par, since none of them is allowed to work as the inter-
national currency; (iii) ﬁnally, any remaining imbalances
between countries (now made symmetric by the operation
of the system), would be kept under control via the penal-
ties envisaged by the Plan. Only the combination of these
measures gives rise to international symmetry, while each
measure taken in isolation is unable to generate this result.
3.3. Implications
It is worthwhile to discuss the implications of this radi-
cal cut. This is done here by sketching the broad picture of a
“conjectural history” of the international monetary system
under the Keynes Plan.
Firstly, because the ICB would have been the only issuer
of the international currency, the internationalmoney sup-
ply would have been managed in the collective interest of
member countries, or at least these countries might have
exercised a more collective control over liquidity.
Secondly, because the international means of payments
would not be a national currency, no “key country” would
have had the privilege of imposing seignorage on the rest
of the world. In other words, countries would not need to
buy – with goods – the currency of one particular country.
Thirdly, debt-credit relations among individual coun-
tries would have been transformed into debt-credit
relations with the ICB. As Keynes argued, “A country is in
debit or credit with the Currency union as a whole” (KCW,
25, p. 74, 3rd draft).
Fourthly, because the international currencywouldhave
the nature of credit money, reserve holdings by Mem-
ber Banks would have disappeared altogether (KCW, 25,
p. 34, ﬁrst draft). Their demands for, and supplies of, for-
eign currencies would simply either cancel out at the
ICB or, for countries in external disequilibrium, would
give rise to a change in the amount of the available
international credit. The role of foreign currencies as inter-
national reserves (both for transaction purposes, and for
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precautionarymotives)would simplyvanish.25 The reasons
(competitiveness or self-insurance) motivating the present
very large foreign exchange holdings by the central banks
of emerging economies are under investigations in current
debates. Although this literature provides very interesting
insights into the costs of reserve holdings (e.g., Rodrick,
2006), it does not raise the question why reserves should
be held in the national currencies of some foreign country,
and whether the related welfare losses could be avoided
by some alternative international ﬁnancial arrangements,
such as, for instance, those envisaged by Keynes.
Finally, no country would be enabled to renege on its
own debt. International redistributions of wealth via key
currency depreciationswould disappear. Thus, while in the
system we live in, “key countries” have an incentive to run
external deﬁcits (because they are aware that the corre-
sponding external debts can be wiped out), in the Keynes
Plan this adjustment mechanism is non-existent.
These are the basic reason why, under this Plan’s provi-
sions, the world would have probably been more balanced
than the present one.
4. Conclusions
I have argued in favour of the enduring relevance of
the Keynes Plan as a remedy for international disequilibria.
Although the Plan was devised to deal with international
imbalances imputable to the role of gold in a regime of con-
vertibility and resulting in deﬂationary pressures, I have
argued that its logic is still valid today, when gold has long
exited the international circulation, and convertibility has
long been forgotten. Because the Keynes Plan may remedy
some of the current international imbalances, it may still
work as a source of useful inspiration for projecting inter-
national monetary arrangements or, at least, as a useful
benchmark for assessing alternative adjustment projects.
The provisions of the Keynes Plan are proposed here as
a logical answer to the asymmetries of the current inter-
national monetary system. Keynes himself considered his
Plan as “a good schematism by means of which the essence
of the problem can be analysed” (KCW, 25, p. 33). In the
same vein, my main objective has been to present a “log-
ical experiment”, illustrating how alternative models of
international ﬁnancial organisation may produce oppo-
site results in the global economy. One model relies on
a national currency performing the role of the interna-
tional money. By contrast, in the Keynes Plan both gold
and national currencies should be demonetised for the pur-
poses of international transactions, and replaced by a credit
money, issued by a supranational agency. This plan was
intended as a means for promoting a symmetric monetary
system and, through this route, a “Keynesian international
balance”, proposed here as a virtual alternative to the cur-
rent situation.
25 “Central banks would buy and sell their own currencies among them-
selves only against debits and credits to their accounts at the Clearing
Bank, designated Clearing Accounts, and would not themselves hold
any foreign currency as distinct from the permitted foreign accounts of
their nationals, except as agents for their Governments where the latter
required foreign trading accounts for current purposes” (KCW, 25, p. 34).
This paper has not tried to assess the political feasi-
bility of a supranational money. Even at a time when the
world was trying to build its own future along new lines,
the Keynes Planwas, according to his own author, “perhaps
Utopian, in the sense not that it is impracticable, but that
it assumes a higher degree of understanding, of the spirit
of bold innovation, and of international co-operation and
trust than it is safe or reasonable to assume” (KCW, 25, p.
33).
Although the virtues enumerated by Keynes as a nec-
essary condition are not probably in sight yet, I like to
conclude this articlewithanoptimisticnote, as recently for-
mulated by an authoritative supporter of a related scheme
of currency integration, Robert Mundell: “Does the role of
the United States today as the sole superpower foreclose
the possibility of an agreement to create an international
currency? I think there are grounds for optimism. First of
all, as a consequence of the frequent currency crises of
recentyears, there is growing recognition that international
monetary arrangements are in a state of crisis. Second, the
advent of the euro has changed the power conﬁguration of
the international monetary structure and diminished the
monopoly position of the dollar. In the future, the dollar
will have to compete for seigniorage and control with the
euro even in the absenceof the reform.Under these circum-
stances, the United States may see that its self-interest as
well as the stability of its economyand that of the rest of the
world lies in the direction of a reconstructed international
monetary system” (Mundell, 2005).
This optimistic note is welcome, as the need for “ﬁnan-
cial disarmament” that motivated Keynes’s proposal (KCW,
25, p. 57) is now felt more than ever.
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